Israel’s War on Lebanon’s Water
Israel has targeted Lebanon’s waters for over 100 years. Today they are waging a war on these waters to cause permanent damage.
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The Invisible Grid of Survival
The water does not come back before the people do. Returnees to villages across southern Lebanon describe the same sequence of discovery: months of displacement end with a journey home undertaken in expectation of ruin. They anticipate the shattered masonry to be cleared from driveways, the collapsed roofs to be patched with fresh timber, and the slow salvage of whatever personal effects survived the bombardment. What they do not anticipate is the silence of the tap. A kitchen faucet opened in a home still standing yields nothing — not even the hiss of air in empty pipes. The damage lies beneath the fractured asphalt, where municipal water mains have been compressed into silt by ordnance. Nearby, the high-capacity backup generator that powered the local deep well stands incinerated; the solar array that ran it lies scattered in fragments. And some distance away, in the dark fissures of the region’s karst limestone, the aquifer itself now carries an invisible burden: heavy metals and military contaminants, dissolved into the only water table these communities will ever have.
The imagery that dominates international coverage of the conflict — the collapsed tower block, the cratered highway — documents the visible war. The evidence gathered for this investigation points elsewhere. Drawing on field reporting conducted across the affected districts, internal reports from institutional utilities, hydrogeological survey data, and hours of recorded civilian testimony, this article documents the systematic dismantling of public water infrastructure: a campaign largely absent from broadcast narratives, yet central to the enduring uninhabitability of the south. Shelters can be erected, and rebuilt walls will eventually cure. But a settlement without clean, pressurised water is not a settlement under strain; it is a settlement in the process of extinguishment. What follows are five findings — several of which run against the prevailing understanding of the conflict — that together illuminate how water infrastructure becomes an instrument of modern geopolitical warfare, wielded not through the destruction of bodies but through the unmaking of the conditions that permit them to remain.
It’s Not a Contemporary Conflict—It’s a 100-Year Hydro-Geopolitical Ambition
To know the destruction of southern Lebanon’s water grid as collateral — incidental damage inflicted by present-day military operations — requires discarding a documentary record that spans more than a century. The hydrographic wealth of the region south of the Litani has occupied Israeli strategic planners not as a contingent wartime aspiration but as a fixed geopolitical objective, one articulated within diplomatic correspondence since the aftermath of the First World War.
The paper trail is explicit. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Zionist delegations submitted formal boundary proposals that placed Palestine’s future northern frontier north of Sidon — a line drawn, on its face, for reasons that had little to do with population or defence and everything to do with hydrology. The object was the Litani River, Lebanon’s principal national waterway, and the proposal sought to fold its entire lower basin inside the borders of the anticipated state. What the conference documents make plain, and what subsequent decades confirm, is that water was never an afterthought of territorial design in this corridor. It was the design.
At the centre of that design sit two hydrological assets of unusual quality. The Hasbani River and its principal spring-fed tributary, the Wazzani, constitute what hydrologists and military planners alike have long recognised as among the most valuable water sources in the Levant. The Wazzani’s properties merit spelling out, because they explain why the site has attracted a century of attention from actors on both sides of a contested border. Its discharge runs cold and high in purity, at volume, throughout the year — a rare and stable yield in a semi-arid region. And it emerges at elevation: gravity alone carries its flow southward, meaning that any power benefiting from it requires no pumping stations, no electrical grid, and no vulnerable machinery of uplift. The water, in effect, delivers itself.
These conditions have made the Wazzani and the Litani basin a recurring object of policy, diplomacy, and armed contestation. Each historical attempt by Lebanon to assert sovereign claims over a proportionate share of these shared basins — through engineering works, through diversion projects, through the ordinary instruments of a state managing its own territory — has been met with military resistance of a decisiveness that itself constitutes evidence. The pattern is the finding. The question this investigation pursues is whether the current destruction of the water grid is the latest chapter of that pattern, or something new.
The 1953 Eric Johnston Plan: US special envoy Eric Johnston proposed dividing the Jordan River basin, allocating 35 million cubic metres of water annually to Lebanon compared to 400 million cubic metres to Israel. Lebanon rejected the proposal as fundamentally inequitable. Yet, to this day, due to persistent security enforcement and physical intimidation, Lebanon’s actual utilisation of the Hasbani has never exceeded one-fifth of that original, modest 35-million-cubic-meter allocation.
The 1960s Headwater Diversions: When Arab states initiated headwater diversion projects in the mid-1960s to retain water within Lebanese and Syrian territories, Israeli forces systematically destroyed the engineering works inside Lebanon and Syria.
The 2002 Wazzani Pumping Conflict: When the Lebanese government constructed a modest local pumping station at the Wazzani Spring to supply basic drinking water to impoverished border villages, Israeli leadership declared the municipal facility an explicit casus belli.
Current Territorial Occupation: Recent hostilities have placed 12 kilometers of the Hasbani-Wazzani river system under direct occupation or military control. Consequently, Lebanon’s surface water extraction in that basin—which previously hovered at a minimal four million cubic meters annually out of a total 155 million cubic meters—has been driven down to zero.
The geography concentrates the argument at a single point: the bend.
The Litani runs 120 kilometres from its source in the Bekaa Valley, and for most of that distance it is Lebanese water moving through Lebanese terrain. Then, below Beaufort Castle — a Crusader-era ruin whose ramparts have watched over the river for eight centuries — the Litani executes a sharp turn westward and runs toward the Mediterranean. At this exact point, the river passes within three kilometres of the border. The water is close enough to touch from the far side of a contested frontier.
On the Lebanese bank above that bend sits a treatment and pumping complex, and its construction history tells its own story about what this terrain permits and what it forbids. The facility was built in the late 1970s to supply the elevated villages of Jabal Amel, and the constraints its engineers faced were so severe that the heavy supply pipes could not be trucked in. They arrived by helicopter slung beneath rotor blades and by pack animal, hauled up slopes that no vehicle could climb. It is a piece of infrastructure that cost extraordinary effort simply to assemble — and whose position beneath a castle overlooking one of the most strategically documented riverbends in the Levant has made it, by the account of multiple observers, a target of long standing.
“Israel considers its essential war to be the war over water resources.”
The claim invites an obvious rebuttal, and the rebuttal must be tested. Israel now operates one of the most advanced desalination programmes in the world; its Mediterranean plants yield roughly 600 million cubic metres of water annually, supplemented by wastewater recycling systems that return reclaimed water to agriculture at scale. On paper, a state so equipped would appear to have outgrown its ancestral thirst for its neighbour’s rivers.
The documents and the demography suggest otherwise. Desalination is expensive energy made liquid; it supplies the coastal cities, but it does not feed the settlement enterprise in the occupied territories, which continues to expand, and which continues to generate a permanent, structural demand for natural freshwater — the kind that arrives by gravity, is unmetered by fuel costs, and is located, in this case, a short distance across a border that has never been accepted as final.
Weaponising Infrastructure to Block Civilian Return (”Spatial” vs. “Sustainable” Repatriation)
The widespread destruction of public utility networks operates as a potent instrument of demographic engineering. Following recent ceasefire announcements, data compiled by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded more than 823,000 displaced Lebanese attempting to return to their home districts in the south, while approximately 334,000 citizens remain trapped in prolonged internal displacement.
In field assessments of these return destinations, OCHA has consistently cited running water and grid electricity as the two critical services most overwhelmingly absent. This utility vacuum directly correlates with the physical destruction of the surrounding built environment. In border villages that drew water directly from the destroyed Hasbani and Wazzani networks—including Khiam, Kfar Kila, Odaisseh, Houla, and Blida—satellite imagery and field audits reveal that over 80% of all residential and municipal structures have been reduced to rubble.
A critical study published by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies conceptualises this crisis by establishing a vital distinction between two modes of civilian repatriation:
Spatial Return: The physical movement of displaced individuals back to the geographic site of their origin, where they may erect tents or shelter inside damaged, unserviced concrete structures.
Sustainable Return: The institutional prerequisite for permanent habitation—requiring functional municipal utilities, working public health infrastructure, economic viability, and reliable drinking water needed to reside, farm, work, and remain indefinitely.
By dismantling civic utility networks, military operations convert potential sustainable returns into brief, agonising spatial visits. Families attempting to resettle find themselves forced to purchase expensive, unregulated water from private tankers or abandon their ancestral lands entirely. The scale of systemic destruction documented by the South Lebanon Water Establishment (SLWE) reveals an operational landscape brought to total collapse:
Infrastructure Category
Documented Damage
Storage Reservoirs
175 damaged or destroyed
Main Pumping Stations
16 major regional stations offline
Wells & Boreholes
124 facilities direct hits
Water Pipelines
Over 2,500 km of distribution mains shattered
Chlorination & Power
104 chlorinators, 85 generators destroyed
Human & Financial Impact
$550M+ structural loss; 700,000+ residents affected; 26 SLWE staff killed
As the sole public entity mandated to manage water assets across the south, the SLWE has been crippled. The state utility has lost 26 staff members to airstrikes during the performance of their duties. Furthermore, with its paying subscriber base shrinking by more than a third—representing a devastating fiscal collapse—and national electrical grids completely severed, utility crews are left dependent on backup generators that require 12 hours of diesel fuel per day but can only afford to run for five.
“If we don’t provide water, they won’t return.”
Surgical Dismantling: Strikes Systematically Target Small, Essential Components
Detailed field assessments compiled by international monitoring organisations, including Oxfam, Action Against Hunger, and Insecurity Insight, demonstrate that the decimation of water facilities is rarely the result of indiscriminate collateral damage. Instead, evidence points to a systematic blueprint aimed at disabling the specific, off-grid components that allow public water networks to function independently of state systems.
Air and artillery strikes routinely target fragile, high-value mechanical assets required for emergency survival operations. Key targets include photovoltaic solar arrays (such as the total destruction of a 270-panel array in Froun and solar installations in Debel), automated chlorination units, deep-well pumps, and backup diesel generators. Without these precise components, an intact concrete reservoir becomes entirely useless.
Humanitarian monitors have highlighted a disturbing trend: facilities rehabilitated by non-governmental organisations are routinely re-struck shortly after being brought back online. In the municipal district of Debaal, a deep water well and solar power installation serving 5,800 residents was fully rehabilitated by the Norwegian Refugee Council following earlier damage. Within months of its completion, a direct airstrike targeted the site, smashing the solar panels and shattering the pump housing.
This systematic targeting places public utility personnel in extreme danger. Bahij Abdallah, an electrical maintenance technician for the SLWE, was monitoring a rural pumping station in Ebel el-Saqi five days after an internationally brokered ceasefire had been formally announced. He was sitting on a stone step outside the clearly marked facility, wearing his official utility uniform, when a precision missile struck the site.
“Suddenly, it stopped in the air for a second, turned, and fell on the station,” Abdallah recalled, describing the wall of displaced air and red-hot shrapnel that tore open his leg, chest, and shoulder. Military bomb disposal units later entered the ruins of the Ebel el-Saqi station to safely disarm a second, unexploded guided aerial bomb.
“I could have died in seconds. And I wasn’t doing anything wrong; I was only pumping water for people to drink.”
The repeated targeting of isolated off-grid solar farms and rural pumping stations located far from active combat zones indicates a deliberate policy to systematically dismantle civilian survival networks rather than incidental war damage.
The Double Environmental Whammy: Record Drought Meets Irreversible Aquifer Contamination
The physical destruction of water infrastructure has landed on top of an ecological emergency that was already underway. Lebanon is living through its worst drought in more than sixty-five years. The Litani River National Authority reports that close to 90% of the country’s natural springs have either dried up or fallen to critical levels, which means the population meets any disruption to supply with almost no margin left.
The shortage then manufactures its own damage. As municipal networks collapse, residents who have run out of patience drill private wells into the groundwater that remains. Over-pumping draws the water table down fast enough to pull saline water into the coastal aquifers, and that form of salinisation does not reverse itself once the surface pipes are mended. The network can be rebuilt within a budget cycle; the aquifer cannot.
Underground, the contamination is chemical as well as physical. Sampling by the National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS) across southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley tested 134 soil locations and found elevated phosphorus concentrations consistent with the heavy use of white phosphorus munitions. Nearly half the samples also carried chromium at levels above what is considered safe for agriculture. The findings put more than 8,200 farmers and roughly 654,000 residents across 200 border villages in direct contact with the contaminated footprint.
The geology makes all of this worse and, in a precise sense, permanent. Southern Lebanon sits on karst limestone, rock that is highly porous and riven with fractures. Hydrogeologists warn that this structure gives heavy metal residues, toxins from unexploded ordnance, and military hydrocarbons a direct route deep underground, into cracks and channels that cannot be flushed out or remediated. What seeps down stays down.
Compounding all of it is the state’s own blindness. Dr Wassim Daher points out that the machinery for detecting the problem is split at the institutional seams: soil monitoring belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture, water quality to the SLWE, and no centralised database connects the two. Standard utility testing kits, meanwhile, were never built to identify complex military chemicals or heavy-metal bomb residues. The practical result is that dangerous compounds can move through the system and into public drinking supplies with nobody positioned to see them.
Broken steel pipelines and cracked concrete reservoirs respond to capital investment. A poisoned karst aquifer does not.
Cultural Erasure: When the Water Disappears, Memory and Heritage Follow
Water is the thread that holds the rural south together, and pulling it out has undone more than harvests. The damage reaches the social fabric itself: the customs, the work rhythms, the reasons families stay.
Froun shows what that unravelling looks like in the account books of a single village. Local honey production, once 30 tonnes a year, fell to three as untended hives perished or their swarms dispersed. The goat herds disappeared. Butcher shops shut. Tobacco fields withered, and the historic olive groves stand abandoned, their unharvested fruit grey with military dust.
Elsewhere, the departures have produced contradictions that locals can read like insults. In Froun, the old village pond, fed by seasonal runoff and historically drawn down each year for irrigation, is unnaturally full. It is full because no one is left to empty it. In Debaal, Insaf Faour, who is 80, notes that her household used to buy private tanker loads during the dry months. This season they bought nothing. “We didn’t buy, because water is available,” she said quietly. “Because there are fewer houses.”
The deeper loss is where people used to meet. For generations, water sources doubled as the gathering points of village life. Insaf Faour remembers walking beside her mother as a girl in Debaal to fill clay jars at the natural spring, laundering clothes there, trading news with neighbours in the evening queue while the spring slowly refilled. Decades later the municipal deep wells were drilled, the spring dried up, and the ritual of assembly disappeared with it.
For the displaced, this is where the war becomes personal. Abeer, a mother of four from Kfarsir who is living in a Beirut school shelter, refuses to go back and look at what remains of her village. What she names, when pressed to name anything, is a 30-year-old mulberry tree her mother planted that once shaded the family home, and her Sunday routine on the banks of the Litani near Qaaqiyet al-Jisr.
“At our river, there are trees that grew by themselves, wild apples, the taste of syrup. Nobody planted them,” Abeer recalled. “We used to go down to it every Sunday... with the watermelon cooling in the middle of the river. But now Israel deprived us of the river.”
This sense of dispossession turned to outrage when a video circulated online showing Israeli settlers swimming in the Hasbani River inside southern Lebanon, while indigenous Lebanese residents remained forcibly barred from accessing their own native waters.
“When you lose your house, you lose your memories and the beautiful things with them.”
The Unspoken Future of Hydrological Warfare
The pattern, once assembled, is difficult to read as an accident. The pumping stations are disabled. The power lines that fed them are cut. The solar arrays that replaced the power are broken. And beneath it all, the karst carries whatever seeps into it forever. Each strike removes another condition of staying, and the sum of these conditions is a place where life becomes impractical. No single crater explains the emptying of the south; the arithmetic does.
It may simply be that water has finally admitted what it always was here: the oldest territorial claim in the region, and the one that outlasts every map. Whether the destruction was co-ordinated matters less than whether it works, and on the current evidence, it does. What happened along the Litani will be studied, for the war over freshwater in the Middle East has barely begun, and someone has now written its operating manual.

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