In this interview, Professor Andreas Krieg of King’s College’s School of Security Studies, lays out a direct argument about how U.S. influence in the Middle East has eroded, how Israel misread the moment, and how the Gulf states stepped into the gap with a strategy that fits the way Washington works now. They’re tied to money, access, and the way American foreign policy is shaped by whoever can pay for it or align with the interests of the people in power.
“American policy has been up for sale and the Israelis understood this.” He’s talking about the way lobbying networks, political donations, think‑tank funding, and media influence shape decisions in Washington. This isn’t new, but he argues the scale of Israeli penetration into U.S. political and media structures is deeper than most people admit. The Congressional Research Service has documented decades of military aid and political alignment between the U.S. and Israel, and multiple investigations have shown how lobbying groups shape legislation and public messaging. Krieg’s point is that this influence has reached a level where it distorts U.S. interests rather than serving them.
He contrasts this with the Gulf states. He says people misunderstand how Gulf lobbying works. “It is not simply Saudi, Qatari or Emirati money pumping billions into Washington and buying people. It is not like that.” His argument is that the Gulf states present themselves as partners who bring stability, investment, and economic opportunities. This lines up with public data: Gulf sovereign wealth funds have poured billions into U.S. tech, real estate, and defense contracts. The U.S. Department of Defense has confirmed that American bases in the Gulf are largely funded by the host countries, not U.S. taxpayers. Krieg’s point is that this makes the Gulf states net contributors to American power.
“Israel is a net consumer of US power. It drains US power. It sucks money out of the US economy and from US taxpayers.” This is backed by the scale of U.S. military aid to Israel, which is locked in at $3.8 billion per year under the 10‑year MOU, plus supplemental packages. Israel does not fund U.S. bases. It does not underwrite U.S. deployments. It does not carry the financial burden of American military presence in the region. Krieg’s argument is that Israel takes and the Gulf states pay.
He also says the U.S. is no longer the dominant force it once was. “We’re seeing the fall and collapse of the US empire. The idea they’re a superpower that can act at will is clearly wrong.” This lines up with analysis from institutions like Chatham House and the Quincy Institute, which have documented the limits of U.S. power projection, especially after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. can still act, but not without consequences, and not without resistance from regional actors who no longer fear American retaliation the way they once did.
Krieg points to a major shift in public opinion across the Arab world. “The Arab street now see Iran as the protector of the Palestinian cause and the only capable obstacle in Israel’s way.” Polling from Arab Barometer and other regional surveys shows a clear trend: support for U.S. policy has collapsed, trust in Israel is nonexistent, and Iran’s position has strengthened because it is seen as confronting Israel directly. Whether people like Iran or not, they see it as the only actor willing to push back.
Then he turns to Trump. Krieg argues that Trump’s worldview is transactional, not ideological. “Ultimately, you have to look at this from a transactional point of view.” Trump has said repeatedly that allies should pay for U.S. protection, that foreign policy should benefit the U.S. economically, and that he evaluates relationships based on what they deliver. Krieg’s point is that the Gulf states understand this and have structured their approach around it: investment, stability, and opportunities for American companies.
“I would not be surprised if the Trump Organization, or firms affiliated with it, turned up in Iran if sanctions are lifted.” This isn’t speculation about Trump personally. It’s an observation about how he operates. If sanctions lift and Iran opens its economy, there will be opportunities. The Gulf states have already signaled they would support a regional de‑escalation if it brings economic benefits. Krieg’s argument is that Trump will look at the numbers: Israel costs money, the Gulf states bring money, and Iran could bring even more if the political environment shifts.
Israel’s aggression costs the U.S. financially and politically. The Gulf states offer stability and profit. Iran offers leverage and regional influence. In his view, Israel miscalculated by assuming its influence in Washington was permanent. The Gulf states adapted. Iran gained legitimacy on the street. And the U.S. is no longer strong enough to force the region into the old framework.
The balance of influence in Washington is shifting, and Israel is losing ground because it no longer aligns with the interests of the people who actually shape U.S. policy. The Gulf states do. Iran benefits from the fallout. And the U.S. is no longer strong enough to force the region into the old framework.
