Israel and Saudi Arabia quietly aligning themselves long before the public photo ops isn’t sudden. For years, regional reporters have been writing about 'unofficial channels' between Tel Aviv and Riyadh from the early 2010s. What is new, however, is the growing understanding of how those channels were established, who was responsible for setting them up, and the role that cyber-warfare and private capital played.
Jeffrey Epstein is at the heart of this situation, not since he was a kind of geopolitical mastermind, but merely because he had access. Manhattan was his platform, and he used it to get together people who normally wouldn't end up in the same room. As reported by Haaretz and further analysed by Middle East Eye, Epstein met on several occasions with senior figures from Israeli intelligence — including those linked to Unit 8200 and former Mossad leaders — while Saudi Arabia was quietly considering technological partnerships with Israel. Gulf media outlets such as Al-Araby Al-Jadeed have also stated that Saudi intermediaries visited New York under the pretext of private business during that same period.
A recurring theme is the so-called "Shariah-compliant crypto" proposal that Epstein took part in. Financial journalists from the UAE and Bahrain observed that Saudi investors were being approached with regard to blockchain projects presented as being religiously acceptable. What was important wasn't the crypto itself but rather the access; Epstein was gaining entry to people close to Mohammed bin Salman, including advisers who subsequently played a key role in the Crown Prince's tech-security initiative. The fact that Gulf commentators reported in pieces about gifts from the Kaaba being sent to Epstein's circle demonstrates how far some of these intermediaries were prepared to go in order to show their loyalty.
The issue of cyber-surveillance is the point at which the alliance ceases to be merely theoretical. Saudi authorities had already been using Israeli military-grade spyware — particularly Pegasus from the NSO Group — years before the normalisationnormalisation talks were made public. This is no guesswork; it has been documented by Amnesty Tech and Citizen Lab and confirmed by regional media outlets such as Middle East Eye and Al-Jazeera's investigative team. Pegasus was employed to keep an eye on dissidents, clerics and journalists, and it was also used on people who were close to Jamal Khashoggi. The Saudi security services didn't simply purchase the software; they acquired a relationship with Israeli intelligence officers who developed the tools.
The fact that Khashoggi was killed in Istanbul revealed how close the relationship between the two countries really was. The Turkish media, particularly the Anadolu Agency and Sabah, published information showing that Saudi agents had been monitoring Khashoggi's communications before the operation took place. Citizen Lab subsequently verified that Pegasus had been used against people in his circle. Israeli sources, such as those writing for Haaretz, admitted that NSO had sold surveillance equipment to Saudi Arabia while obtaining export licences from the Israeli Ministry of Defence. Therefore, the cyber connection between Saudi Arabia and Israel was not a secret arrangement; it was one that had the approval of the state.
As for the money, Jared Kushner's $2 billion investment from the Saudi Public Investment Fund was not merely a political favour. As regional business publications such as Al-Araby and Gulf Business have pointed out, the fund's initial allocations corresponded with Israel's technology and defence sectors—specifically with firms in the field of cybersecurity, drone manufacturers, and companies associated with former Israeli military officers. Israeli economic reporters have observed that Saudi capital has been slowly entering the Israeli arms sector via private equity vehicles registered in the UAE and Bahrain. The Abraham Accords have made this process easier, but the necessary groundwork had already been put in place.
The result is an image of a shadow pact supported by three main elements: cooperation in the field of intelligence, surveillance technology, and private capital. Epstein’s involvement was not ideological but rather logistical; he brought together people who needed one another—Israeli intelligence officers seeking Gulf clients, Saudi advisers in search of tools to strengthen their power, and Western intermediaries who could transfer money without it being scrutinised.
Regional analysts have been open in stating what this alliance implies. Lebanese and Palestinian commentators regard it as an element of a wider strategy aimed at suppressing dissent throughout the region, while Turkish analysts view it as a security partnership based on a fear of political opposition. Moreover, even some Israeli columnists acknowledge that the relationship with Saudi Arabia has turned into one of the most important unofficial alliances in the Middle East, one that is not the result of diplomacy but rather of surveillance, repression, and money.
The discussions aimed at achieving public normalisation were merely on the surface; the actual alliance—the one that had been established in private rooms as a result of spyware contracts, secret meetings, and investment funds—was already operating. Epstein did not create it; he merely helped to make it more effective.
